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Abstract  
Research indicates that low-income families with children have many motives to 
save, however, the costs of raising children, low wage employment, means tested 
programs, and the need for child care make it difficult for them to save.  Using data from 
the American Dream Demonstration (n=1,801), this study examines saving performances 
of low-income families with children in a matched savings program – Individual 
Development Accounts (IDAs).  The results indicate that households with children in 
IDAs can save when they are provided structured opportunities.  In addition, this study 
finds that institutional factors, not merely individual characteristics, are highly associated 
with IDA saving performance, and are important in explaining saving performances in 
IDAs.  Implications for policy makers and program administrators to better assist low – 
income families to save and accumulate assets in IDAs are given.  
  
Key words:  families with children; dependent children; saving; assets; low-income; 
institutions; IDAs   
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Saving and Asset Accumulation among Low – Income Families with Children in 
IDAs  
Economic hardship appears to be higher for families with dependent children 
compared to other household types.  Empirical evidence suggests that families with 
children also face more difficulties in trying to save than other households, especially 
low-income families (Aizcorbe, Kennickell, & Moore, 2003).  Though motivations to 
save may not differ significantly between household types, and in fact, may be stronger 
for families with children, the costs associated with raising children significantly impact 
saving outcomes.  Income, education, race, and number of young children in the 
household are critical factors in determining who saves and who does not (Aizcorbe et 
al., 2003).     
A relatively new policy to encourage savings and assets accumulation among 
low-income families is the Individual Development Account (IDA).  IDAs are matched 
savings accounts, targeted to low-income people that provide institutional structures 
including incentives for saving.  Account holders receive matching funds as they save for 
assets that promote long-term well-being and financial self-sufficiency such as 
homeownership, post-secondary education, or microenterprise (Sherraden, 1988; 
Sherraden, 1991).  IDA programs and policies have generally made little or no distinction 
between participants with or without dependent children. Yet, the experiences and 
challenges facing participants with children, particularly single mother participants, are 
likely to be different.    
IDA participants with children might find it harder to save because of higher 
consumption patterns related to fulfilling the needs of children, personal philosophies 
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related to parental investment, and saving constraints associated with government benefit 
programs.  The purpose of this study is to examine the experiences of low-income 
families with dependent children in IDAs.  Dependent children, for purposes of this 
study, are defined as children of the participants in the study sample who are eighteen 
years of age or younger.    
Literature Review  
Theories of Saving  
Saving behavior is most often described as a function of income and 
consumption. The life cycle hypothesis (LCH) assumes that consumption and savings 
patterns represent an individual’s age or stage within the life cycle, with a majority of 
saving occurring in the middle years.  However, recent LCH models suggest significant 
heterogeneity within and across age cohorts. Conditions apart from income, such as race, 
education of parent, and family composition, including number and ages of children may 
also affect saving behavior.  Furthermore, more recent models provide evidence that low-
income households do not exhibit savings behavior predicted in original LCH models. 
Young households typically have lower saving than older cohorts due to lower earnings, 
education expenses, and expenses related to raising young children (Calvet & Comon, 
2003; Lusardi, Cossa, & Krupka, 2001). When applying this model to low-income 
families specifically, consumption floors and asset limitations related to means-tested 
benefits should also be considered, which may alter the shape of the saving pattern.    
Consistently across studies, as the number of children increases, family saving 
decreases (Kazarosian, 1997).  Using 1984 – 1994 data from Michigan Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (PSID), Hurst, Lough, and Stafford (1998) find that families with 
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children make more frequent saving deposits than households with no children, yet 
because the amount deposited is often smaller than for other households, the net worth of 
households with children is significantly lower (Hurst, Luoh, & Stafford, 1998).   
An institutional model of saving suggests that institutional factors greatly 
influence an individual’s ability to save.  According to this perspective, asset 
accumulation mainly results from institutional arrangements that involve explicit 
connections, rules, incentives, and subsidies (Sherraden, 1991).  “Institutional 
arrangements provide tremendous access and incentives to accumulate assets.  People 
participate in retirement pension systems because it is easy and attractive to do so.  This 
is not a matter of making superior choices.  Instead, a priori choices are made by social 
policy, and individuals walk into the pattern that has been established” (Sherraden, 1991, 
p.127).      
Sherraden, Schreiner, and Beverly, (2003) identify five institutional variables they 
consider instrumental in individual saving and asset accumulation.  The first variable is 
access.  They argue that individuals who have access to institutionalized mechanisms are 
more likely to have higher saving rates than those who lack access.  The second variable 
is information.  Information refers to the extent to which people understand the process 
and rewards of saving.  The more people understand the more likely they will be engaged 
in savings.  The third variable is incentives.  People are more likely to save when there 
are enticements to do so.  The fourth variable is facilitation.  Individuals who are 
provided with saving facilitation, which makes saving more manageable and convenient, 
will more likely increase their willingness to save compared with those who are not 
provided facilitation.  The fifth variable is expectations.  People who have specific 
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savings expectations are more likely to save more than those who do not have savings 
expectations.  
Saving Challenges among Low-Income Families with Children  
Contemporary savings models suggest that families with children have several 
motivations to save including: saving to purchase a home, saving for their children’s 
college education, bequests to their children in later years, or precautionary motives such 
as saving to buffer shocks or for retirement (Browning & Lusardi, 1996; Lusardi et al., 
2001; Steelman & Powell, 1991).  In spite of these motivations, they may also face 
several challenges in trying to save compared to families with no children.     
Costs of raising children.  Costs associated with raising children significantly 
impact a family’s ability to save.  As the number of children in a household increases, so 
does the level of economic hardship. Economic hardship, defined as difficulty paying for 
basic necessities, has a more exaggerated negative effect on saving among low-income 
households (Browning, 1992; Meyers & Lee, 2003; Mirowsky & Ross, 1999).  The 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) compared household expenditures for 
families with children and found expenses positively correlated with income and age of 
children. Three primary expenses were evident in these families: housing, food, and 
transportation, which increase as children grow older.  Interestingly, expenditures per 
child were actually less in households with three or more children than in single child 
households (Lino, 2003).  
Work-family balance and the need for child care.  Another essential cost for 
families with small children is childcare.  Use and allocation of financial resources 
toward childcare often depend on cultural values and beliefs.  For example, some prefer 
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to utilize family and friends as caregivers and others prefer center-based care (Holloway, 
Fuller, Rambaud, & Eggers-Pierola, 1997).  There are also families for which choice is 
not available.  Many low-income parents are employed in shift-work positions, which 
tend to change frequently and often do not coincide with childcare center hours of 
operation.  Therefore, family and friends are relied upon to provide care, either in place 
of or in addition to center-based childcare services.  In some instances, childcare centers 
are unavailable in low-income neighborhoods forcing these working parents to solely rely 
on friends and family (Holloway, et al, 1997). Reliance on these informal sources of 
childcare sometimes leads to ineligibility for childcare subsidies, potentially doubling 
childcare expenses for these families (Lowe & Weisner, 2004).  
Low-income employment market.  Savings amounts are found to be positively 
associated with household earnings.  Income generation alone is challenging for heads of 
households participating in low-wage employment markets.  When combined with 
circumstances typically associated with unstable markets such as, fewer benefits and 
limited chances for job promotions, saving is even more difficult for low-income families 
(Meyers & Lee, 2003).  Income-expense ratios for low wage earners with children create 
a hardship in terms of asset accumulation as wages are high enough to make them 
ineligible for government assistance (e.g. child care assistance, housing assistance, and 
health care) but are not high enough for them to be eligible for tax incentives.   
Means-tested programs.  There is some evidence suggesting that government 
programs are associated with a disincentive to save (Hurst & Ziliak, 2004).  Low-income 
families with children must contend with disincentives associated with means-tested 
government programs such as Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), Supplemental 
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Security Income (SSI), Medicaid, and Food Stamps.  As participants in these programs 
reach or exceed asset limitations, their benefits are either reduced or eliminated 
altogether.  It seems that these programs tend not to consider the episodic and often 
unstable nature of low-wage employment positions (Lowe & Weisner, 2004).  Such 
government restrictions on asset holdings reduce the incentive for households to save.  
Additionally, families who do receive welfare support may perceive a false sense of 
financial security, thus resulting in lower precautionary savings (Hubbard, Skinner, & 
Zeldes, 1995; Hurst & Ziliak, 2004).  Studies indicate that as means-tested programs have 
increased asset limits, savings among families with children have also increased 
(Hubbard, Skinner, & Zeldes, 1995; Hurst & Ziliak, 2001).    
Though low-income families with children face a number of challenges to saving, 
policies and programs that encourage saving can provide incentives and facilitation to 
save and are important for families with children.  IDAs are one such program.  As 
mentioned earlier, the purpose of this study is to examine the experiences of low-income 
participants with children in IDAs.  Specifically, the following questions are addressed: 
(a) What are the individual characteristics associated with savings outcomes among IDA 
participants with children; (b) What are the institutional characteristics associated with 
savings outcomes among IDA participants with children; (c) What are the program and 
policy implications for supporting asset building for families with children?   
Methods  
Data and Sample  
The data come from the “American Dream Policy Demonstration” (ADD), the 
first large-scale test of IDAs designed to study the merits of IDAs as a community 
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development and public policy tool. Beginning in 1997, ADD research followed more 
than 2,000 participants at 14 community-based program sites across the United States for 
four years (1997 - 2001). The Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED) in 
Washington, DC, designed and guided ADD, while the Center for Social Development 
(CSD) at Washington University designed and conducted much of the research. IDA 
programs in ADD are operating in community-based organizations that are working 
together with financial institutions. In most cases, participants in ADD are at or below 
200% of the federal income-poverty guidelines, with a median value of 100% poverty 
level.   
As mentioned earlier, participants in IDA programs (including ADD) receive 
general financial education classes on how to save small amounts of money with a formal 
financial institution.  These small savings are then matched over time to enable a 
participant to invest in homeownership, education, or microenterprise (Sherraden, 1991).  
The accounts are similar to other defined contribution plans such as 401(k) retirement 
plans.  Just like 401(k) retirement plans, IDAs offer a monetary incentive for 
participation.  Every dollar saved by an IDA participant—in an IDA account—is matched 
by funds from a private source (e.g., charitable organizations or foundations) or from a 
public source.  Although programs may vary, participants usually receive general 
financial education (mentioned earlier) and “goal” specific training.  For example, an 
account holder saving for a micro-business receives general basic instruction on financial 
management and consumption, including balancing a checkbook.  In addition he/she 
receives micro-business specific training such as business-plan writing and marketing.  A 
participant saving for homeownership receives instruction related to owning a home, 
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while participants saving for education receive training related to investing in education.  
The organizations in ADD are a diverse group of community development 
corporations, social service agencies, and for-profit and not-for profit organizations (see a 
detailed description by Sherraden et al., 2000).  Although all the programs offer an 
incentive to save (in the form of a match), each program offers somewhat different 
opportunities, constraints, and consequences.  For example, where some programs may 
offer a 1:1 match for a specific saving goal, say microenterprise, other programs may 
offer a 2:1 or 3:1 match for the same goal.  The match rate across programs and/or uses 
ranges from 1:1 to 7:1.  Similarly, where some programs offer 6 hours of general 
financial education, other programs may offer more or less.  In addition, programs may 
differ on several other measurable variables including whether a program encourages 
direct deposit for IDA deposits and whether a program supplements general financial 
education with a peer-group mentoring system.  The variation in measurable program 
characteristics (including the match rate) is partly due to the requirements of individual 
programs implementing IDAs and partly due to the requirements set by funding sources. 
ADD employed a multi-method research design to gather information on many aspects of 
IDA programs and participants including 8 different research methods such as cross-
sectional survey of participants, in-depth interviews, and an experiment site with random 
assignment. While data from the experiment site are not ready for analysis at this point, 
this study used data that comes from monitoring all savings transactions.  Program staff 
collected both program and participant data with the Management Information System 
for Individual Development Accounts (MIS IDA). MIS IDA was designed by the Center 
for Social Development at Washington University for this research purpose.  MIS IDA 
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tracks program characteristics, participant characteristics (both socio-demographic and 
financial), and all IDA saving transactions for all ADD participants at all 14 ADD 
program sites. The data are then checked for data entry errors, outliers, missing cases, and 
inconsistencies of the data using MIS IDA quality control software.  Missing cases in this 
study ranged from 0% to 9%, with the majority of cases having no missing cases. An 
examination of the variables with the missing cases in this study revealed no obvious 
pattern in the missing data. Savings data are from financial institutions and, thus, are 
highly accurate.  This may be the best available data set on savings patterns among low 
income families (Sherraden, 2002).     
Participants in this analysis include all enrollees, including those who have 
dropped out of the program without a matched withdrawal. The regression analyses use 
the participants' characteristics that were recorded at enrollment to avoid issues of two-
way causation between income and savings.   
The MIS IDA data are complemented by an additional data set that came from a 
program-level survey conducted with the 14 ADD sites.  The survey data was collected 
using face-to-face and telephone interviews with administrative personal at the 14 ADD 
sites.  The survey instrument was designed based on constructs suggested by institutional 
theory (Ssewamala & Sherraden, 2004).  
Measurement  
Dependent variable.  The dependent variable in this study is the saving outcome, 
Average Monthly Net Deposit (AMND).  AMND is defined as net deposits per month 
and is calculated as deposits plus interest minus unmatched withdrawals, divided by the 
number of months of participation.  Thus, AMND controls for the length of participation 
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in the program.  The variable, net deposits used to calculate AMND, is defined as 
deposits plus interest (net of fees) minus unmatched withdrawals.  Net deposits includes 
matched withdrawals (withdrawals for matchable uses), but excludes deposits in excess 
of the match cap (maximum amount that can be matched) or deposits made after the time 
cap (the number of months after opening an account in which a participant may make 
matchable deposits).  Excess deposits, late deposits, and unmatched withdrawals are 
savings in IDA accounts, but they cannot be matched and therefore are not considered net 
deposits.  AMND is the key measure of savings outcomes in this study because greater 
AMND implies greater savings and assets accumulation (Schreiner et al., 2001).    
Independent variables. The independent variables include participant and 
program characteristics. Participants’ demographics include gender (1 = female, 0 = 
male); age (in years); a set of dummies that measures marital status: single, 
divorced/separated and married (the reference group); number of children (under 18 yrs); 
and number of adults (18 yrs and older) in the household. We also include a set of 
dummy variables indicating whether participants identify his/her race as African 
American, Latino or Hispanic, Other category, or Caucasian (the reference category). 
Another set of dummies measures education attainment of participants:  Do not have a 
high school diploma (reference group), have a high-school diploma, some college but no 
degree, and graduated from college. Finally, employment status of a participant is 
measured by whether he or she was employed full time (> 35 hours per week), employed 
part time (< 35 hours per week), unemployed (reference group) or a student.   
Participants’ financial characteristics include a dummy variable for whether a 
participant has ever received TANF or AFDC; monthly household income; car ownership 
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(1 = yes, 0 = no); home ownership (1 = yes, 0 = no); and having either a checking or 
savings account (1 = banked, 0 = unbanked). For the purpose of interpretation, we 
divided the household income by 100 for the regression analyses.  
Four institutional constructs are included in the analysis.  They are facilitation -- 
operationalized as direct deposit; incentives -- operationalized as match rate; information 
--operationalized as hours of financial education and peer group meeting (which allow for 
information sharing); expectations -- operationalized as monthly saving target.  
Specifically, the institutional  characteristics are included as follows:  Direct deposit (1 = 
yes, 0 = no); 4 dummies for match rate, 1:1 (reference group), 2:1, 3:1, and 4:1 to 7:1; 
financial education received (in hours); monthly saving target and peer group meetings.  
IDA participants are required to attend free financial education and asset-specific classes 
as part of the program.  Financial education classes cover material regarding financial 
management and saving strategies, and include topics such as how to create a budget, 
how to manage money, and how to fix and establish credit records.  The asset specific 
classes provide specific information on the desired asset.  In our analysis we include a 
measure of general financial education, which depicts the number of financial education 
hours a participant has taken.  The monthly savings target measure included in our 
analysis is the total match cap (that is, the limit on the amount of deposits that can be 
matched) divided by the time cap (that is, the number of months after opening an account 
in which a participant may make matchable deposits).  Finally, the peer group meeting 
variable asks whether there have been formal peer group meetings of IDA participants in 
addition to financial education.   
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Analysis  
This study focuses on the experiences of IDA participants with dependent 
children, defined as 18 years or younger (n=1,801).  In the analysis phase some 
descriptive statistics are produced to characterize this group.  Then, in order to answer the 
second question, “What individual characteristics are associated with saving performance 
for IDA participants with children?” and the third question, “What institutional 
characteristics are associated with saving performance for this group?” a hierarchical 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis is conducted.  The first step of the 
hierarchical regression explores individual characteristics associated with saving among 
IDA participants with children.  The second and third steps of the hierarchical regression 
answer two additional questions:  (1) Controlling for the effects of individual 
characteristics, what institutional characteristics are associated with saving for this 
group?  (2) Controlling for the effects of individual characteristics, do institutional 
characteristics [measured (step 2) and unmeasured (step 3)], as a block, affect the saving 
performances of IDA participants with children?      
  
Results  
Table 1 shows the sample characteristics of IDA participants with children.   
Individual Characteristics  
Most of the participants in this group were female (84%) and were living in an 
urban area (86%).  Ages ranged from 13 to 69 years, with a mean age of 34 years, and a 
standard deviation of 8.81.  About half (46%) of the participants were single, 29% were 
divorced, separated, or widowed, and 24% were married.  The average number of 
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children in the household was two and the average number of adults in the household was 
1.5.  Sixty percent of the households have one adult.  The majority of the participants 
were African American (48%), followed by Caucasian (36%), Latino (9%), and Other 
ethnicity (7%).     
Approximately 17% of the participants did not complete high school, 26% had a 
high school degree, 37% attended some college but did not graduate, and 20% had a 
college degree (either 2 year or 4 years).  The majority of participants (62%) were 
employed full time (35 hours per week or more), while 21% worked part time.  Eight 
percent were unemployed or not working and 8% were students (see Table 1).    
 About 54% reported that they never received AFDC or TANF.  The mean monthly 
household income was $1,454, with a median income of $1,360.  In annual terms, the 
average income was $17,448 a year.  The majority (76%) of the participants with children 
had either a checking or savings account (other than their IDA).  Sixteen percent owned a 
home, and 65% owned a car (see Table 1).   
Institutional Characteristics  
Only 6% of the participants with children had direct deposit.  Twenty-four percent 
of the participants with children had a match rate of 1:1.  Fifty percent had a match rate 
of 2:1, 15% had a 3:1 match rate, and 6% had between 4:1 to 7:1 match rate.    
IDA participants are required to attend free financial education and asset-specific 
classes as part of the program.  IDA participants with children received, on average, 10 
hours of general financial education.  Monthly savings target is defined as the amount 
which, if saved each month and not removed in unmatched withdrawals, will be matched.  
The average monthly saving target for this group is $42.30.  Approximately one third of 
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the programs included peer group meetings (See Table 2).    
Saving Performance of Families with Children  
The results of the Hierarchical OLS regression analysis when AMND was 
regressed on the individual characteristics and measured institutional characteristics is 
significant [F(27, 1,504) = 18.9, p = .000] and explained approximately 26% of the 
variance in AMND (R
2
 = .26, Adjusted R
2
 = .24) (see Table 3).    
The regression results indicate that all of the institutional variables and several 
individual variables are associated with savings for IDA participants with children.  
Specifically, race is significantly related to saving; when compared to Caucasians, being 
African American is associated with a $3.43 decrease in AMND.  Hispanics/ Latinos are 
associated with a $5.31 increase in AMND compared to Caucasians.  Other Ethnicity is 
associated with a $4.79 higher AMND compared with Caucasians.   
Education is also significantly related to AMND.  Participants who graduated 
from college (2-years or 4-years and above) are associated with a $6.31 higher AMND 
than IDA participants with children who did not complete high school.  Looking at 
employment, being a working student is associated with $6.36 higher AMND when 
compared with being unemployed/ not working.  Higher income is associated with higher 
AMND.  Although these results imply that IDA participants with higher monthly income 
save more, it is a small effect.  A $100 increase in household income is associated with a 
$0.33 increase in AMND.     
Assets ownership (home, car and bank account) is associated with saving for IDA 
participants with children.  Specifically, participants who are homeowners have a $4.89 
higher AMND than participants who are not homeowners.  Likewise, participants who 
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are car owners are associated with a $2.83 higher AMND than participants who do not 
own a car.    
Participants who have either a checking or savings account (excluding their IDA 
account) are associated with a $3.16 higher AMND than participants with no accounts.  
Turning to institutional characteristics, direct deposit is associated with AMND.  
Specifically, compared to participants who do not have direct deposit, having direct 
deposit is associated with an increase of $4.69 in AMND.  Hours of financial education 
attended by IDA participants is also statistically related to AMND.  Specifically, each 
additional hour of financial education is associated with a $0.86 increase in AMND.  
Match rate is also statistically associated with IDA savings.  A match rate of 2:1 is 
associated with a $3.33 decrease in AMND, a match rate of 3:1 is associated with a $7.13 
decrease in AMND, and a match rate of 4:1 to 7:1 is associated with a $7.99 decrease in 
AMND compared with a 1:1 match rate.  
Monthly saving target is significantly related to AMND.  Each additional dollar in 
the monthly saving target is associated with a $0.32 increase in AMND.  Finally, peer 
group meetings are statistically associated with AMND. Participants in programs that 
offer peer group meetings in addition to regular financial education meetings, are 
associated with a $15.14 higher AMND compared with participants in programs that do 
not offer these additional peer group meetings.     
Effect of Institutional Characteristics as a Block   
In order to determine the specific amount of variance that institutional variables 
(measured and unmeasured) can be accounted for, above and beyond what has been 
explained by the individual variables, when predicting AMND for IDA participants with 
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children, hierarchical regression is used.    
Table 4 indicates that controlling for individual characteristics, the measured 
institutional characteristics as a block significantly (P<.001) increase the variance 
explained in AMND for this group.  As can be seen in Table 4, individual characteristics 
alone account for 15% of the variance explained in AMND (R
2
=.15).  Adding the 
measured institutional characteristics to the model as a block increases the variance 
explained in AMND in 11% (R
2
=.26), and adding the program dummies (unmeasured 
factors linked with programs) as a block accounts for an additional 4% increase in 
AMND of the variance (R
2
=.29).     
Examination of the significant level changes when the measured institutional 
characteristics were entered into the model suggests that age and education -- attendance 
of some college when compared with no high school -- became insignificant.  Working 
students compared with the unemployed, became significantly related to savings.  When 
the program dummies were added into the model, race (African American and Latino / 
Hispanic), assets ownership (car and bank ownership), direct deposit, and a match rate of 
3:1 compared with a match rate of 1:1 became insignificant.  The number of children 
became significantly related to savings.  These changes in significant variables are not 
unexpected, however.  When covariates that are mildly correlated with existing variables 
are introduced into the model, predication variables that are not highly significant can 
have their p-values shift enough to cross the border from p<.05 to p>.05 and vice-versa.  
For example, the p-value for number of children shifted from .085 to .038 when program 
dummies were entered into the model.   
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Limitations  
Some limitations of this study are important to note.  First, the data analysis phase 
uses individual characteristics that were collected on the participants at the time of their 
enrollment in the IDA programs.  Individual characteristics may have changed during the 
time an individual spends in the program, which might have some relationship to the 
saving outcome; however, these changes have not been recorded (Ssewamala, 2003).  
Second, this study assumes that deposits in IDAs come from new savings.  However, it 
may be the case that some participants in IDAs are transforming money from other assets 
they have, and as a result, deposits are coming from assets that have been shifted and not 
from new savings (Schreiner et al., 2001; Zhan, Sherraden, & Schreiner, 2002).  Third, 
while statistical analyses controlled for stratification by site by including the 14 program 
dummies in the Hierchical OLS, it did not control for possible inter-site correlation of the 
error term.    
Finally, since ADD data were not collected using randomized assignment 
techniques, there is lack of control in the data, which means that it is hard to attribute the 
effects of participating in IDAs on the saving outcomes.  It is difficult to determine how 
participants would have saved if they were not participating in IDAs.  The experimental 
design in ADD will be able to test to this; however, the data are not yet available.   
Discussion and Implications  
This study is the first quantitative examination of the saving performance of low-
income households with children in IDAs.  The results indicate that households with 
children in IDAs can save when they are provided with structured opportunities.  The 
AMND for this group is $19.07 with an average 2:1 match rate, families with children 
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can accumulate $57.21 a month or approximately $2,060 over an average of three years 
in the program.  Is this enough money to enable low-income families with children to 
accumulate assets? IDA participants do use their savings to pursue life goals.  Home 
ownership is the most common use of IDA savings in ADD. When combined with other 
housing programs, savings of $2,000 or sometimes less can turn the homeownership 
dream into reality in many regions of the United States.  
We examined the unique experiences of low-income households with children in 
IDAs by looking at individual and institutional factors that may be associated with IDA 
saving performance for this group.  Results indicate that institutional factors, not merely 
individual characteristics, are highly associated with IDA saving performance, and are 
important in explaining saving performances in IDAs.  This supports the institutional 
theory on savings that suggests that when provided with access, information, incentives, 
facilitation, and expectation, even low-income families with children can save and 
accumulate assets in IDAs.     
Individual Characteristics Associated with Saving among Families with Children  
Several individual characteristics are associated with saving performance for IDA 
participants.  Race is one factor associated with savings among families with children.  
African Americans had significantly lower AMND when compared with Caucasians.  
Latinos or Hispanics, and Other Ethnic Minorities on the other hand, saved more than 
Caucasians.  These findings are in line with other findings on racial differences in savings 
in IDAs (Grinstein-Weiss & Sherraden, 2004; Schreiner, Clancy, & Sherraden, 2002).  
Further research on what helps some ethnic groups do better than other groups in terms of 
saving is needed.    
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IDA participants with children who have a college degree are associated with 
higher savings when compared to participants with no high school.  Similar results 
obtained by Lusardi, et al., (2001) indicate that education greatly impacts the saving and 
net worth of families with children.  Parents who hold a college degree are more likely 
than those with a high school diploma or less to own savings and checking accounts and 
invest in high risk assets.  These findings are also in line with the literature on 
homeownership.  It is consistently suggested that individuals with less than a high school 
education are considerably less likely to become homeowners over the life course 
(Gyourko & Linneman, 1997; Masnick & Di, 2001).     
Higher income is also associated with higher saving amounts for IDA participants 
with children.  However, this is not a large effect.  A $100 increase in income is 
associated with only $0.33 increase in AMND.  This finding is congruent with findings of 
other research on ADD that finds that income is not strongly related to savings (Schreiner 
et al., 2002; Sherraden, Schreiner, & Beverly, 2003).  Looking at employment, IDA 
participants with children who are working students are associated with higher savings 
when compared to IDA participants with children who are unemployed.        
Assets ownership, specifically home ownership, car ownership, and being banked, 
seems to be an important predictor of savings among families with children.  Home 
ownership and car ownership may be a proxy to the fact that participants already have 
some experience with saving.  Participants who are car owners may also find it easier to 
get to financial institutions to make a deposit and to get to financial education classes.  In 
addition, participants who are “banked”, having either a saving or checking account, are 
associated with higher savings.   
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There may be several explanations why unbanked IDA participants with children 
find it harder to save compared to banked participants with children.  First, being banked 
implies an existing relationship with financial institutions and thus implies greater 
financial sophistication.  Second, banked individuals may find easier ways to make 
deposits by establishing direct deposits or simply making deposits by mail, avoiding 
transaction costs associated with making a special trip to the bank (Schreiner et al., 
2001).  Third, being unbanked may be a proxy for unobserved characteristics that may be 
associated with savings such as country of origin and neighborhood characteristics.     
Institutional Characteristics Associated with Saving among Families with Children  
The institutional theory of saving posits that institutional characteristics other than 
individual characteristics may play an important role in promoting savings (Beverly & 
Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden, 1991; Sherraden et al., 2003).  In order to assess the amount 
of variance that institutional variables (as a block) accounted for, beyond what has been 
explained by the individual variables, this study uses hierarchical regressions analyses.  
The results indicate that controlling for individual variables, institutional variables 
(financial education, peer group meetings, match rate, direct deposit, and monthly saving 
target) and unmeasured institutional variables (program dummies) lead to a significant 
and considerable increase in the variance explained.  These results support the argument 
that institutions have an important role in shaping savings behavior and may explain a 
significant part of the variance in personal savings, thus implying that polices and 
program design can have a positive effect on savings among low-income families with 
children.   
IDA programs require financial education as a way to provide information and 
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economic literacy to the participants.  This study finds that hours of financial education is 
highly associated with savings outcomes among IDA participants with children.  
Specifically, each additional hour of financial education is associated with an increase in 
saving amounts for this group.  This result is consistent with other studies reporting that 
financial management programs can improve financial knowledge and behaviors of the 
low-income population (Caskey, 2001; Clancy, Grinstein-Weiss, & Schreiner, 2001; 
Jacob, Hudson, & Bush, 2000).  Therefore, it is recommended that financial education 
should be an initial program requirement.         
Peer group meetings, in addition to financial education classes is another way to 
share information among low income families with children.  This study finds that peer 
group meetings are an important predictor of savings.  It seems that peer group meetings 
might enable IDA participants with children to share their experiences related to savings.  
This might include providing advice on how to save as well as encouragement to save, in 
a supportive environment.  Based on this result it is suggested that more programs 
incorporate peer group meetings in their program designs.     
It is sometimes assumed that higher match rates will increase saving but the 
literature on saving incentives is inconclusive.  While some researchers find that saving 
incentives have significant positive effects on promoting saving behavior (Poterba, Venti, 
& Wise, 1994), others find only moderate or no effect of incentives on saving behavior 
(Engen, Gale, & Scholz, 1994; Hubbard & Skinner, 1996).  Results of this study find that 
match rate is associated with a decrease in saving amount.  Sherraden, Schreiner, & 
Beverly (2003) suggest three possible explanations as to why match rate is associated 
with a decrease in saving for participants in IDAs.  First, programs may set match rate 
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levels regardless of saving expectations of the participant.  Second, regardless of match 
rate, participants may try to use all their match eligibility.  Third, when the saving goal is 
set from the beginning, participants may choose to save less and still enjoy the same 
return.    
Based on an institutional view of saving, direct deposit is a simple and efficient 
method of facilitation (Beverly & Sherraden, 1999; Sherraden et al., 2003).  In moving 
money directly from one account to another, the chance that an individual will use the 
money for consumption is decreased.  As expected, IDA participants with children who 
use direct deposit save higher amounts than IDA participants with children who do not 
use direct deposit.  Programs should encourage more participants to use direct deposit 
and provide the mechanism to do so.       
Expectations refers to the idea that people who have specific saving goals are 
more likely to save more than those who do not have specific saving goals, or have lower 
saving goals.  The monthly saving target is used in this study as a measure of expectation.  
Each IDA program establishes its own monthly saving target.  It is hypothesized that a 
higher monthly savings target will provide incentives for higher savings.  Indeed, this 
study finds that a monthly saving target is strongly associated with higher savings for 
IDA participants with children.  These results suggest that IDA programs could increase 
their limits on matchable deposits in order to encourage higher savings.      
In conclusion, participants with children in IDAs have the ability and willingness 
to save toward accumulation of assets.  These findings suggest that asset-building 
policies may enable more low-income families with children to save and accumulate 
assets by designing and promoting programs such as IDAs that provide institutional 
 Center for Social Development 23  
mechanisms to save.   
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Individual Characteristics of the Sample   
  
  
Independent variables  N  Mean S.D.  
        
Gender (1 = female)  1801 .84  .37  
Age  1801 34.39 8.81  
Marital status        
Single  1781 .46  .50  
Divorce/Separated/  
Widowed   1781 .29  .46  
Married  1781 .24  .43  
Household composition        
Number of Children  1801 2.27  1.3  
Number of Adults  1781 1.47  .69  
Race/ Ethnicity         
African American  1801 .48  .50  
Latino/ Hispanic  1801 .09  .28  
Other ethnicity   1801 .07  .26  
Caucasian  1801 .36  .48  
Education        
No high school  1798 .17  .37  
Completed high school   1798 .26  .44  
Attended some college   1798 .37  .48  
Graduated from college   1798 .20  .40  
Employment        
Unemployed  1799 .08  .28  
Working student  1799 .09  .28  
Employed part-time  1799 .21  .41  
Employed full-time  1799 .62  .49  
Household income  1757 14.54 7.02  
Public assistance (1 = Never used TANF/ AFDC ) 1782 .54  .50  
Asset ownership        
Home ownership  1799 .16  .36  
Car ownership  1798 .65  .48  
Bank account  
  
1799 .76  .43  
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Table 3:  Descriptive Statistics for Institutional Characteristics of the Sample   
  
  
Independent variables  N  Mean S.D. 
        
Direct deposit   1693  .06  .24  
Match rate        
1:1  1801  .24  .43  
2:1  1801  .50  .50  
3:1  1801  .15  .36  
4:1 to 7:1  1801  .06  .23  
Financial education   1703  10  6.06 
Monthly saving target  1801  42.3  20.79 
Peer group meetings  1686  .32  .47  
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Table 4:  Hierarchical Regression Analysis:  Individual and Institutional 
Characteristics and Average Monthly Net Deposit    
  
  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  
Independent variables  b  S.E b  S.E b  S.E  
Gender               
Female  -0.74  1.89 -0.74  1.78 -0.64  1.75  
(Male)                     
Age  0.18*  0.08 0.10  0.07 0.06  0.07  
Marital status                    
Single  -2.21  1.97 -1.66  1.87 -1.31  1.85  
Divorce/Separated/  
Widowed   -0.43  2.05 0.33  1.93 0.96  1.90  
(Married)                    
Household composition                    
Number of Children  -0.78  0.49 -0.79  0.46 -0.94*  0.46  
Number of Adults  0.74  1.03 1.43  0.99 1.62  0.98  
Race/ Ethnicity                     
African American  -7.35*** 1.46 -3.43*  1.42 -2.68  1.53  
Latino/ Hispanic  5.04*  2.33 5.31*  2.21 3.03  2.41  
Other ethnicity   4.82*  2.46 4.79*  2.31 4.52*  2.30  
(Caucasian)                    
Education                    
(No high school)              
Completed high school   1.50  1.96 0.71  1.85 0.03  1.82  
Attended some college   4.07*  1.91 1.88  1.81 1.09  1.79  
Graduated from college   9.33*** 2.15 6.31*** 2.04 5.63***  2.02  
Employment              
(Unemployed)                    
Working student  4.17  2.98 6.36*  2.81 6.60*  2.76  
Employed part-time  -0.19  2.46 -0.03  2.33 2.37  2.34  
Employed full-time  -1.58  2.29 -1.93  2.20 -0.47  2.20  
Household income  0.38*** 0.10 0.33*** 0.09 0.28***  0.09  
 Public assistance                    
Never used TANF/ AFDC   -0.68  1.32 0.35  1.24 0.90  1.24  
(TANF/AFDC used/using)                    
Asset ownership              
Home ownership  3.99*  1.75 4.89*** 1.68 5.30***  1.76  
Car ownership  3.55**  1.44 2.83*  1.36 2.37  1.35  
Bank account  5.45*** 1.54 3.16*  1.45 2.55  1.45  
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Table 4:  Hierarchical Regression Analysis:  Individual and Institutional 




1  Model 2  Model 3  
Independent variables  b S.E b  S.E  b  S.E 
Direct deposit        4.69*  2.32  4.35  2.29 
Match rate                   
(1:1)              
2:1       -3.33**  1.36  -5.60***  1.70 
3:1       -7.13*** 2.30  -4.01  3.66 
4:1 to 7:1       -7.99*  3.50  -9.45*  4.03 
Financial education        0.86*** 0.10  1.23***  0.12 
Monthly saving target       0.32*** 0.03  0.37***  0.05 
Peer group meetings  
     15.14*** 1.62  37.50***  4.20 
Program dummies                   
ADVOCAP             7.65*  3.62 
Near Eastside IDA Program             -6.35  4.18 
Heart of America Family Services  
           
24.94***  5.06 
Human Solutions             26.20***  4.61 
MACED             16.87***  5.37 
Community Action Project of Tulsa, 
program 1             
17.90***  4.63 
Shorebank Corporation             23.27***  4.04 
Women’s Self-Employment Project  
           
21.41***  4.17 
Alternative Federal Credit Union  
           
-7.10  4.88 
Central Texas Mutual Housing 
Association               
19.96***  5.41 
Community Action Project of Tulsa, 
program 2              
16.28***  4.31 
Central Vermont Community Action 
Council             
-
14.01***  3.69 
(CAAB Corporation)              
 
 
*p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; ***p ≤ .000  
 
 Center for Social Development 32  















Model 1:  
Individual Characteristics:  
[gender, age, marital status, household composition, 
race/ethnicity, education, employment, household income, 







Model 2:   
Measured Institutional Characteristics:  
[direct deposit, match rate, financial education,  monthly 
savings target, peer group meetings]  
  
.26 .24  .11***
Model 3:  
Unobserved factors linked with programs/program/site 
dummies  
ADVOCAP  
Near Eastside IDA Program   
Heart of America Family Services   
Human Solutions  
MACED  
Community Action Project of Tulsa (2 sites)  
Shorebank Corporation  
Women’s Self-Employment Project  
Alternative Federal Credit Union  
Central Texas Mutual Housing Association  
Central Vermont Community Action Council   
Bay Area IDA Collaborative  
CAAB  
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